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N 2006, Texas legislators enacted the most substantial franchise tax
reform the state has seen since 1907, coupled with major changes to
the property tax mechanism for funding public schools. Given the
significance of these legislative changes, this year's Survey focuses on leg-
islative and judicial developments to the exclusion of regulatory and ad-
ministrative interpretations.
I. SALES TAX
Several cases recently decided by the Austin Court of Appeals address
the scope of the Texas sales tax. Chevron Pipe Line v. Strayhorn upheld
the application of the sales tax to otherwise nontaxable services per-
formed in conjunction with a taxable service,' and DuPont Photomasks v.
Strayhorn narrowly interpreted the sale-for-resale exemption. 2 In these
decisions, the court of appeals also endorsed the Comptroller's ability to
interpret the law. While the court of appeals broadly applied the sales
tax, it viewed a taxpayer's means of seeking a refund much more nar-
rowly in Rahmes v. Louis Shanks of Texas, Inc., concluding that the only
avenue for the taxpayers in that case to seek a refund of erroneously
collected taxes was the specific statutory framework set forth in Chapters
111 and 112 of the Tax Code.3
In Chevron Pipe Line, the court of appeals upheld the Comptroller's
determination of tax liability for excavation and backfilling services per-
formed in conjunction with the remedial installation of cathodic pipeline
protection devices, reasoning that those services were not nontaxable
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1. Chevron Pipe Line Co. v. Strayhorn, 212 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Tex. App.-Austin
2006, pet. filed).
2. DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 219 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. App.-Austin
2006, pet. denied).
3. No. 03-04-00298-CV, 2005 WL 3331620, *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 9, 2005, no
pet.) (mem. op. not designated for publication).
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"unrelated services" under Comptroller Rule 3.357.4 Chevron Pipeline
Company ("Chevron") had determined that it needed to "recoat" a bur-
ied pipeline and install new cathodic protection devices.5 Chevron's ex-
pert witness testified that the recoating process required several distinct
crews: one crew to excavate the pipe, a second crew to strip the old coat-
ing from the pipe, a third crew to apply a new coating, and the original
crew to re-cover, or "backfill," the pipeline.6 Cathodic protection is, ac-
cording to expert witness testimony, "a method of protecting the pipe-
lines by installing an anode, which serves as the object of corrosion
instead of the pipeline."' 7 The method of cathodic protection that Chev-
ron employed with regard to the pipeline in question involved running a
cable from the anode bed, a separate bed away from the pipeline, to a
rectifier, and then from the rectifier to the pipeline. 8 Third-party contrac-
tors hired by Chevron performed the installations of cathodic protection
devices and the excavation and backfilling services. 9
During an audit of Chevron, the Comptroller assessed taxes against
Chevron for unpaid sales tax on the excavation and backfilling services it
purchased. 10 Chevron paid the deficiency under protest and filed suit
seeking a refund, arguing that the excavation and backfilling services con-
stituted nontaxable "unrelated services."' 1 The trial court found that the
cathodic protection installations essentially repaired or upgraded the ex-
isting nonresidential real property and that the excavation and backfilling
did not constitute unrelated services. 12 On appeal, Chevron contended,
first, that the installation of cathodic protection devices was nontaxable
new construction and, second, that the "excavation and backfilling ser-
vices purchased in conjunction with other repair services [were] nontax-
able 'unrelated services' within the meaning of Comptroller Rule
3.357.13
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision with respect to
both issues. 14 In arriving at this holding, the court of appeals deferred to
the Comptroller's construction of Rule 3.357, declaring that "the Comp-
troller has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret whether a particular service
falls within the categories of 'taxable services' enumerated in section
151.0101(a) of the Tax Code. ' 15 To qualify as new construction under
Rule 3.357, the activity must result in "the addition of new, usable square
4. Chevron, 212 S.W.3d at 781, 788 (discussing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (2006)
(Comptroller of Public Accounts, Nonresidential Real Property Repair, Remodeling, and
Restoration; Real Property Maintenance)).
5. Id. at 781.
6. See id. at 781-82.
7. Id. at 782.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 781.
11. Id. at 783.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 784 (discussing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (2006)).
14. Id. at 788.
15. Id. at 786.
1312 [Vol. 60
Taxation
footage to an existing structure.'16 Despite the fact that Chevron installed
the remedial cathodic protection devices in new holes or trenches, the
court of appeals held that "this activity does not meet the definition of
*new construction' in Rule 3.357.1"17 According to the court of appeals,
"the evidence demonstrates that remedial installation of cathodic protec-
tion devices simply prevents the existing pipeline from corroding,"18 and
those devices "do not add 'new, usable square footage to an existing
structure' within the meaning of Rule 3.357 and, therefore, do not satisfy
the rule's definition of 'new construction. "' 19 To buttress this determina-
tion, Justice Patterson added the following insightful (and colorful) anal-
ogy: "[T]he remedial installations of cathodic protection devices is like
adding stadium lights to Wrigley Field. It allows you to use the existing
structure for a longer period of time, but it does not increase the usable
square footage of the structure. '20
With regard to whether excavation and backfilling services constituted
"unrelated services" performed in conjunction with the work performed
on the pipeline, the court of appeals disagreed with Chevron's assertion
that those services were provided on a stand-alone basis.21 Despite the
fact that excavation and backfilling services are not included in the list of
taxable services in Section 151.0101 of the Tax Code, the Comptroller
assessed a tax due on those excavation and backfilling services purchased
by Chevron in conjunction with the pipeline taxable repair services it pur-
chased, i.e., recoating the pipeline.22
The court's analysis reaches beyond the facts of this case because many
of Texas's taxable services are subject to a similar "unrelated service"
test. Under Rule 3.357(a)( 15), a service is unrelated if:
(A) it is not the repair, remodeling, or restoration of nonresidential
real property, nor a service or labor that is taxable under any other
provision of the Tax Code, Chapter 151;
(B) it is of a type that is commonly provided on a stand-alone basis;
and
(C) the performance of the service is distinct and identifiable. 23
The court of appeals held that Chevron failed the second and third
prongs of the test, reasoning that, although a taxpayer might purchase
excavation and backfilling services on a stand-alone basis, Chevron had
purchased these services to enable its repair of the buried pipeline. 24
Chevron's expert witness testified that "Chevron could not recoat its un-
16. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)( 8) (emphasis added).
17. Chevron, 212 S.W.3d at 786.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357).
20. Id. at 786.
21. Id. at 788.
22. Id. at 786-87.
23. Id. at 787; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)( 15).
24. See Chevron, 212 S.W.3d at 787-88.
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derground pipelines without excavation and backfilling. '' 25 In some ways,
this holding appears somewhat inconsistent with Rylander v. San Antonio
SMSA L.P., which recognizes that both taxable and nontaxable items
may be part of a single transaction. 26 The case demonstrated the Comp-
troller's view that services that are nontaxable if purchased on a stand-
alone basis may become taxable services if closely and inextricably re-
lated to the purchase of taxable services.27
In DuPont Photomasks, the Austin Court of Appeals determined that
DuPont Photomasks, Inc.'s ("DuPont"). purchase of a cleanroom was not
exempt from the Texas sales tax under the sale-for-resale exemption, re-
gardless of whether the lease of the cleanroom was incidental to the lease
of the building in which it was housed.28 In arriving at its decision, the
court of appeals upheld the validity of Rule 3.294(k)( 1).29 In 1996, Du-
Pont entered into a joint venture with three semiconductor manufacturers
to create the DuPont Photomasks, Inc. Reticle Technology Center, L.L.C.
(the "Center") for the purpose of developing technologies for the
fabrication of photomasks.30 The agreement among the companies speci-
fied that DuPont would construct and operate a cleanroom as well as a
building to house the cleanroom. Moreover, the agreement defined the
"Facility" as "the development and manufacturing facility to be con-
structed... and leased by [DuPont] to the [Center] and dedicated to the
[Center's] business."' 31 Subsequently, DuPont constructed two buildings,
each of which was dedicated to facilitating the operation of the cle-
anroom, and, pursuant to the agreement, DuPont leased those facilities to
the Center. 32
Under Section 151.005, the lease of tangible personal property is a sale
that is subject to taxation.33 Nevertheless, for the purpose of avoiding
double taxation, the lease of tangible personal property may be exempt
from taxation under the sale-for-resdle exemption.34 The Comptroller's
rule interpreting the resale exemption provides, in relevant part, that if a
contract for a real property lease includes a lease of tangible personal
property (such as furniture) as part of the agreement, no sales tax is due
on the lease of the tangible personal property.35
DuPont, relying upon the fact that the items it purchased to construct
the cleanroom would be leased to the Center, did not pay sales tax on the
25. Id. at 788.
26. 11 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); see Cynthia M. Ohlenforst
et al., Taxation, 54 SMU L. REV. 1595, 1596-97 (2001); see also Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et
al., Taxation, 59 SMU LAW REVIEW 1565, 1566 (2006).
27. San Antonio SMSA, 11 S.W.3d at 487.
28. DuPont Photomasks, 219 S.W.3d at 419-20.
29. Id. (discussing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 3.294 (2006) (Comptroller of Public Ac-
counts, Rental of Tangible Personal Property)).
30. Id. at 416.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
34. DuPont Photomasks, 219 S.W.3d at 419.
35. Id. (discussing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294(k)( 1) (2006)).
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purchase of the items used to construct the cleanroom. 36 DuPont argued
that the resale exemption applied because the purchased personal prop-
erty to be leased was "of greater importance than the leasing of the real
property," reasoning that the phrase "incidental to" in Section 151.006
means "subordinate to" or "a minor accompaniment. ' 37 According to
DuPont's reading of Section 151.006, "rule 3.294(k) improperly prohibits
the invocation of the exemption for the lease of real and personal prop-
erty when the lease of the personal property is of paramount importance
to the agreement," and the Comptroller exceeded her rulemaking author-
ity by contravening the plain language of the statute.38
The court of appeals summarily dismissed DuPont's contention that the
comptroller exceeded her rulemaking authority, 39 noting that the court
"will defer to an agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable and
does not contradict the plain meaning of the statute. '40 The court of ap-
peals further concluded that the "plain meaning" of the phrase "inciden-
tal to" is unclear; "incidental to" may be used interchangeably with
"incident to," and these phrases may mean either "happening by chance
and subordinate to some other thing; peripheral" or "closely relating to;
naturally appearing with."'41 Because the Comptroller's interpretation of
the resale exemption was longstanding, the court of appeals was willing to
presume that the legislature had adopted the Comptroller's construction
by the legislature's re-enactment without substantial change of the statu-
tory provisions.42 Third, the court of appeals favored the public policy
implications of a bright-line rule that "tangible personal property leased
in conjunction with real property is not eligible for the sale-for-resale ex-
emption" over a subjective analysis based on the parties' intent.43
The court of appeals further concluded that DuPont could not avail
itself of the Section 151.006(2) resale exemption, which allows an exemp-
tion for the sale of tangible personal property "for the sole purpose of the
purchaser's leasing or renting it," reasoning that the tangible personal
property, and not the constituent parts purchased to construct or create
such tangible personal property, is what must be both purchased and
leased or rented.44 The court of appeals noted that "DuPont did not
purchase a cleanroom; on the contrary, it purchased various items that
were assembled to make a cleanroom," and that, therefore, the purchase
of "the items necessary for the construction of the cleanroom" was not
exempt. 45
36. Id.
37. Id. at 420-21.
38. Id. at 420.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 420-21.
42. Id. at 422.
43. Id.
44. DuPont Photomasks, 219 S.W.3d at 423 (discussing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.




The court of appeals also tackled the rights of taxpayers to claim re-
funds. Rahmes v. Louis Shanks of Texas, Inc. confirmed that taxpayers
have no common-law right to seek refunds for erroneously collected
taxes. 46 Todd Rahmes filed suit against Louis Shanks of Texas, Inc., a
furniture store, and the Metropolitan Transit Authorities ("MTA") seek-
ing a refund of sales tax improperly charged on a delivery of furniture
beyond the MTA's jurisdictional territory.47 Although Rahmes acknowl-
edged that Chapters 111 and 112 of the Tax Code provide a comprehen-
sive administrative scheme for taxpayers who seek a refund, Rahmes
contended that the Tax Code did not provide an exclusive remedy and
that he also had a "common-law right to recover taxes that were paid
involuntarily under fraud, duress, or mistake. '48 The court of appeals
disagreed and held that Chapters 111 and 112 of the Tax Code provide a
taxpayer's exclusive remedy for seeking a refund.49
II. FRANCHISE TAX
Although once imposed solely on taxable capital, the franchise tax has
included an alternate "earned surplus" calculation, based loosely on fed-
eral taxable income, since a 1991 legislative expansion of the tax. Both
the pre- and post-1991 tax applied to corporations, limited liability com-
panies, and banking corporations, but until the 2006 amendments, not to
partnerships, or to limited partners whose only connection with Texas is a
limited partnership interest. The Texas Supreme Court's mandate that
the legislature find a constitutional plan for school funding by a June 2006
deadline,50 coupled with legislative frustration at the large number of en-
tities that successfully planned around the tax by operating through part-
nerships, set the stage for sweeping changes to the long-standing Texas
franchise tax.
The Governor appointed a special commission which held hearings
across the state and ultimately presented legislators with recommenda-
tions to change fundamentally the calculation of the franchise tax. The
commission's recommendations formed the basis for what became House
46. No. 03-04-00298-CV, 2005 WL 3331620 *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 9, 2005, no
pet.).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Louis Shanks, No. 03-04-00298-CV, 2006 WL 3331620, at *2.
49. Id. at *5. The ability of taxpayers to request refunds directly from the state, rather
than through the seller from whom the taxpayers purchased good, has varied over the past.
As the court of appeals noted, in 2003, the legislature amended Section 111.104 of the
Texas Tax Code and "removed a taxpayer's right to directly initiate administrative pro-
ceedings so that, as of June 20, 2003, a taxpayer must first obtain an assignment of rights
before filing an administrative refund claim." Id. at *4 n.7. The court of appeals did not
reach Rahmes's claim that the 2003 legislative amendment is "an unconstitutional restraint
on the open courts provision because it permits a retailer to 'completely control' whether a
consumer may seek a remedy" because Rahmes purchased the furniture on which he paid
the improperly charged sales tax in May of 2000. Id. at *4 n.7; see also id. at *1.
50. The Texas Supreme Court accelerated the push for tax reform by holding, in Nee-
ley v. W. Orange-Cove Consolidated Ind. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005) that Texas's
method of funding public education violates the Texas Constitution.
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Bill No. 3 and included an entirely new tax that combines elements of a
gross receipts tax with elements of a net income tax. Partly because of the
Texas Supreme Court's deadline and partly because of the political envi-
ronment, the House quickly passed House Bill No. 3 with very few
amendments. Then, although many House members undoubtedly ex-
pected to see the bill again in conference committee, the Senate passed
the House version without any amendments.5 ' An advantage of the legis-
lature's prompt action is the timely enactment of a reformed tax; a disad-
vantage is the confusion that arises from some of the enacted language,
including from ambiguities and drafting errors that legislators did not
have the opportunity to fix before the session ended.
When this article was written, the legislature was considering technical
(and perhaps other) changes to the law; both the State Bar of Texas Tax
Section52 and the Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants 53 re-
leased written comments on the tax, and the recently elected Texas




The new law is effective for reports filed on or after January 1, 2008,55
and, like other taxes based on activity during a period prior to the report
year, the tax reaches back to 2007-and even earlier for some
taxpayers.56
While the new tax incorporates many provisions from prior law, the
margin tax differs from the "old" franchise tax in several material
respects:
(1) it applies to additional businesses/entities; 57
(2) it has a different starting point (revenue); 58
51. The Senate's decision not to amend the bill reflected the court's deadline, political
pressures, and the Senate's concern that the House would be unable to muster sufficient
votes to pass an amended bill. Note also that House Bill No. 3 is part of the larger tax and
education legislation enacted during the 2006 special session.
52. http://www.texastaxsection.org/SectionofTaxationlettertoFrankBattle-HB3.pdf
[hereinafter the "Texas Tax Section Comments"].
53. http://www.tscpa.org/gvt/News/MarginTaxReportl106.asp [hereinafter the
"TSCPA Comments"].
54. See H.B. 3 § 23, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (Tex. 2006) (requiring the state's largest taxpay-
ers-measured by several different reference points, including amount of 2005 report pe-
riod tax liability, 2005 gross receipts, 2005 number of employees, and amount of school
maintenance-and operations property tax for 2005-to file these "information reports."
Comptroller Guidelines (available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/franchise105-
158_instructions/index.html) for filing the returns were among the first interpretations of
the new tax).
55. H.J. of Tex., 79th Leg., 3d C.S. 140-42 (2006).
56. H.B. 3 § 22, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (Tex. 2006).
57. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (as effective January
1, 2008) (all subsequent references to the Texas Tax Code are to this January 1, 2008 ver-
sion of the Code unless otherwise noted).
58. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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(3) it requires combined reporting for many entities; 59
(4) it has different rates for different taxpayers (one percent for most
taxpayers and one half percent for wholesale and retail sellers);60 and
(5) it allows deductions from revenue for either (a) cost of goods sold
or (b) compensation, 61 in both cases, as defined by the Texas Tax Code
and as apportioned to Texas. 62
Generally, the starting point for computing the margin tax is a taxable
entity's total revenues. 63 A taxable entity subtracts from this "revenue"
number its choice of either cost of goods sold ("COGS") or compensa-
tion.64 This election may be changed on an annual basis65 and applies to
all members of a combined reporting group,66 each of which computes its
revenue and deductions separately. 67 The resulting amount is the entity's
margin. 68 The margin is multiplied by the entity's Texas apportionment
factor,69 which is the entity's Texas gross receipts divided by its total gross
receipts. 70 Thus, the single-factor formula used for the old franchise tax7'
is generally retained but without the throwback rule.72 The resulting
amount is the entity's taxable margin.73 The taxable margin is then multi-
plied by the one-percent tax rate (or the one-half percent tax rate for
retailers and wholesalers),74 to arrive at the entity's tax.75 Taxpayers with
total revenue of less than or equal to $300,000 (with CPI adjustments for
later years) or total tax liability of less than $1,000 are not required to pay
the tax. 76 Additionally, the tax may be reduced by certain already ac-
crued but unused credits, 77 as well as by a credit for certain losses. 78
Entities That Are Subject to Margin Tax
Although many proponents of the new tax describe the tax as applica-
ble to all entities that have limited liability under state law, the list of
taxable entities is more specific than, and sometimes inconsistent with,
59. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
60. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
61. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a)( 1)( B)( ii) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
62. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
63. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
64. § 171.101(a)( 1)( B)( ii).
65. § 171.101(d).
66. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
67. § 171.1014(c), (e), (f).
68. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
69. § 171.101(a)( 2).
70. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
71. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (Vernon 2002) (as in effect until January 1,
2008).
72. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon 2002) (as in effect until January 1,
2008). Texas held the throwback rule unconstitutional, at least on facts presented, in Home
Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 175 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
73. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
74. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
75. § 171.002(b).
76. § 171.002(d).
77. See H.B. 4 §§ 17-19, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (Tex. 2006).
78. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.111 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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that description. 79 A significant change to the tax is its application for the
first time to partnerships. 80 Although not all partnerships are subject to
the tax, the legislature-after many unsuccessful efforts during prior ses-
sions-successfully extended the tax to most limited partnerships. 81 Be-
cause operating in partnership form has been a key component of Texas
franchise tax planning for years, expanding the tax to partnerships is ex-
pected to bring large numbers of taxpayers into the tax net. The net is
made even broader by the adoption of combined reporting, discussed
below.
The margin tax provides that the "taxable entities" subject to the tax
include all legal entities (including limited partnerships, which were not
taxable under the old franchise tax) other than those set forth in an enu-
merated list that includes the following:
" Sole proprietorships;82
" General partnerships, the direct ownership of which is composed ex-
clusively of natural persons;8 3
- "Passive entities; '84
* Certain entities, such as some nonprofits, that were exempt under
the old franchise tax are still exempt under the new margin tax;85
- Grantor trusts with natural persons or charitable entities as the sole
beneficiaries; 86
" Estates of natural persons; 87
* Escrows;88
" Family partnerships that are passive entities;89
" "Passive investment partnerships;" 90
" Certain passive entities-trusts with natural persons or charitable en-
tities as their sole beneficiaries; 91
o Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") that do not directly own
real property (other than the real estate that the REIT occupies "for bus-
iness purposes") and qualified REIT subsidiaries; 92 and
* Investment conduits. 93
The new tax includes several "cliffs" that trigger all-or-nothing results:
one step over the cliff (e.g., one non-qualifying partner) and disaster may
79. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
80. § 171.0002(a).
81. Id.
82. § 171.0002(b)( 1).
83. § 171.0002(b).
84. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(b)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
85. § 171.0002(b)( 4).
86. § 171.0002(c)( 1).
87. § 171.0002(c)( 2).
88. § 171.0002(c)( 3).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(c)( 4) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
90. § 171.0002(c)( 5).
91. § 171.0002(c)( 7).
92. § 171.0002(c)( 8).
93. § 171.0002(c)( 9); § 171.0002(d).
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ensue (e.g., a nontaxable general partnership becomes taxable). For ex-
ample, if a partner dies and the partner's estate holds the partnership
interest, the otherwise nontaxable general partnership no longer qualifies
as nontaxable-it now has a partner that is not a "natural person." How-
ever, it is widely believed that legislators did not anticipate or intend that
a partner's death would transform a nontaxable partnership into a taxa-
ble one, and legislators appear ready to change the statute to avoid the
harsh, unintended consequences that might otherwise result from this
"cliff" language. 94 The grantor trust provision appears to create another
cliff, so that when a beneficiary dies or a charitable entity beneficiary
ceases to qualify as a charitable entity, the trust would become taxable.
Although many legislators believed they had enacted a tax that
reached lawyers and accountants practicing in limited liability partner-
ships, a drafting error appears to allow such LLPs a technical escape
route if all partners are natural persons: Texas LLPs are general partner-
ships that elect LLP status,95 so LLPs composed entirely of natural per-
sons should not be subject to the tax. However, even before the last
special session ended, legislators were focusing on changes to ensure that
the tax applies to LLPs, which are among the entities targeted by many
legislators.
Legislators intend that nonprofit entities of the type that are exempt
from the old franchise tax also be exempt from the margin tax. Accord-
ingly, a new Tax Code section provides an exemption for a noncorporate
entity that would qualify for one of the specific exemptions if it were a
corporation.96 Although legislative intent is relatively clear-to continue
to provide an exemption for the type of entities that Texas has previously
exempted-the language is somewhat imprecise. For example, because
trusts are not subject to the pre-margin franchise tax, the pre-margin
franchise tax statute does not include an exemption for trusts, or a spe-
cific reference to tax-exempt trust-retirement plans. A technical correc-
tion is likely to include a specific exemption for qualified pension, profit
sharing, and stock bonus plans, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
In many respects, real estate businesses fare relatively well under the
new tax, although unanswered questions remain concerning both compu-
tation and application of the tax to real estate enterprises. Although
REITs may be nontaxable, REIT partnership subsidiaries may be taxa-
ble, so many real estate investments appear more likely to be taxed, even
if indirectly, than under prior law.
Determining the standards for which holdings are "direct" holdings,
and when real estate is used "for business purposes" will likely trigger
continued controversy.
94. All this talk of cliffs and falling should not discourage the wary from thoughtful
analysis and perhaps even creative planning.




Texas has not traditionally followed federal tax classifications although
the earned surplus calculation of the pre-margin franchise tax is com-
puted by reference to federal tax numbers. Nor does the margin tax con-
sistently follow federal income tax classifications, but it is computed by
reference to federal tax revenue. Significantly, limited liability companies
that are disregarded and treated as sole proprietorships for federal in-
come tax purposes are not treated as exempt sole proprietorships for
margin tax purposes.
To the extent the old franchise tax relied on the federal Internal Reve-
nue Code and Treasury regulations, it referred to the code and regula-
tions as in effect for the federal tax years beginning before January 1,
1997, prior to the effective date of the federal "check-the-box" entity clas-
sification rules.97 The margin tax, by contrast, refers to the Internal Reve-
nue Code and Treasury Regulations in effect for the federal tax year
beginning on January 1, 2006-well after the effective date of the check-
the-box regulations and other federal law regarding disregarded entity
principles.98
Special Rules For Passive Entities
A limited exclusion from the tax exists for certain trusts and partner-
ships that meet the definition of passive entities.99 The distinction be-
tween the taxability of partnerships and that of corporations remains in
this context and may merit a continued preference for partnerships in
some situations.
A "passive entity," which is excluded from the definition of "taxable
entity," is defined as a partnership or trust: (1) with over ninety percent
of its federal gross income from: 100 "dividends, interest, foreign-currency-
exchange gain, periodic and nonperiodic payments with respect to no-
tional principal contracts, option premiums, cash settlement or termina-
tion payments with respect to a financial instrument, and income from a
limited liability company"; 10 1 positive distributive shares of partnership
income; 10 2 "gains from the sale of real property, commodities traded on a
97. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 2002) (as in effect until January 1, 2008)
("Internal Revenue Code" ("I.R.C.") means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in effect
for the federal tax year beginning on or after January 1, 1996, and before January 1, 1997,
and any regulations adopted under that code applicable to that period.).
98. Another effect of updating the I.R.C. reference is that the depreciation rules under
the margin tax now match current federal law. Questions remain about how taxpayers
should reflect the transition from the old I.R.C. depreciation to computing depreciation
under the current I.R.C. for their COGS calculations. This updating for margin tax pur-
poses of the reference to the I.R.C. may create some confusion as to when and how federal
disregarded entity principles affect margin tax computations.
99. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(b)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
100. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003(a)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
101. § 171.0003(a)( 2)( A).
102. § 171.0003(a)( 2)( B).
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commodities exchange, and securities";10 3 and royalties, bonuses, or de-
lay rental income from mineral properties and income from other mineral
interests not operated directly or by an affiliate (rent is specifically ex-
cluded from passive sources); 10 4 and (2) with not more than ten percent
of its federal gross income from an active trade or business, 10 5 where (i)
items of income in (1) are not from an active trade or business,106 (ii)
"active trade or business" is defined in very general terms, 107 and (iii)
income from licensing intangibles to affiliates for use in their active trade
or business is deemed active to the licensor.10 8
It appears unclear whether a taxable entity could ever pass the ninety-
percent-passive test but fail the ten-percent-active test. The overlapping
definitions apparently resulted from combining multiple draft provisions
without the time or redrafting that typically accompanies major tax legis-
lation; ideally, the technical corrections bill should repeal the confusing
ten-percent test. Another issue legislators will address is whether the
"gains" from the sale of real property included in the ninety-percent com-
putation refer only to federal income tax capital gains or to all gains from
the sale of property, regardless of federal characterization.
A "passive entity" is by definition not subject to the tax. Confusingly,
the margin-tax statute lists four categories of specific "passive entities"
that are excluded from the definition of taxable entity if they meet other,
additional criteria. 109 Given the fact that an entity which meets the "pas-
sive entity" definition appears to be nontaxable without regard to any of
the other requirements established for the additional categories, the sig-
nificance of these additional requirements is debatable. Administrative
guidelines and rules could take the position that these "extra" require-
ments must be met, although such a result would appear contrary to legis-
lative intent. As with respect to the ninety-percent-active and ten-
percent-passive income tests, the additional tests appear to be the result
,of cobbling together various draft legislative proposals rather than a plan
to create a two-prong test, and the legislature is likely to reconsider the
additional tests.
103. § 171.0003(a)( 2)( C).
104. § 171.0003(a)( 2)( D); (b)( 1)-( b)( 2). The exclusion of rent from amounts that
count toward the ninety-percent gross income test is clearly a key factor for real estate
businesses.
105. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003(a)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
106. § 171.0003(a-1).
107. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0004(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
108. § 171.0004(d). Although some commentators refer to passive entities as "exempt,"
it is more accurate to treat them -as being excluded from the tax base, rather than being
subject to the stricter burden of proof that applies to exemptions.
109. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.0002(c)( 4) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (family limited
partnership); (c)( 5) (passive investment partnership); (c)( 6) (passive investment general
partnership); and (c)( 7)( trust passive entity).
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Revenues: The Starting Point for Calculating Margin Tax
Although the margin tax is not a straight gross receipts tax, the compu-
tation begins with a number that approximates gross receipts for many
companies. In an effort to tie at least some of the margin calculations to
taxpayers' federal tax returns, legislators tied the starting point for most
taxpayers to taxpayers' federal tax return numbers. The statute specifies
two sets of federal tax return line items includible in revenue, one set for
an entity "treated for federal income tax purposes as a corporation"'11 0
and another set for an entity "treated for federal income tax purposes as
a partnership." ' Revenues begin with this number, from which certain
specified items are subtracted. 1 2 For other taxable entities, the statute
directs the Comptroller to adopt rules for computing margin "in a man-
ner substantially equivalent" to the above definitions. 113
The specified line items of federal income generally include items of
gross income before deductions or offsets. But, as a result of what has
been widely characterized as a drafting error, only net income from part-
nership real property rental activities is included in the margin tax calcu-
lation.1 4 Legislators have already indicated that the provision should be
revised to include gross rents." 5 Also, guaranteed payments are double
counted in the tax base as a result of another drafting error, 1 6 and legis-
lators appear poised to correct this error as well. 117
Subtractions from Revenue
A taxable entity may exclude or subtract, to the extent otherwise in-
cluded in total revenues, certain specified items set forth in an enumer-
ated list that includes the following:" 8
* Bad debt if expensed for federal tax purposes;1 1 9
" Distributive shares of income from pass-through entities, Schedule C
deductions, and "items of income attributable to" disregarded entities (in
all cases, other than any income from "passive entities"); 120
110. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(c)( 1)( A) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (revenue com-
puted by adding IRS Form 1120, line 1c, to Form 1120, lines 4 through 10).
111. § 171.1011(c)( 2)( A) (revenue computed by adding IRS Form 1065, line 1c, to
Form 1065, lines 4 through 7, and Form 1065, Schedule K, lines 2 through 11).
112. § 171.1011(c)( 1)( B); (c)( 2)( B).
113. § 171.1011(c)( 3).
114. § 171.1011(c)( 2)( A)( iii) (adding line 2 of Internal Revenue Service Form 1065,
Schedule K, which references net rental real estate income).
115. Tex. H.R. Cong. Res. 51, 79th Leg., 3d C.S., 2006 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (taxes affecting
businesses) (evidencing legislative intent to make this'revision).
116. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(c)( 2)( A) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
117. Tex. H.R. Cong. Res. 51, 79th Leg., 3d C.S., 2006 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (taxes affecting
businesses) (evidencing legislative intent to make this revision).
118. § 171.1011(c)( 1)( B), (c)( 2)( B), (f), (g), (g-1), (g-2), (g-3), (k), (m), (m-1), (n),
(o), (q), (r).119. § 171.1011(c)( 1)( B)( i), (c)( 2)( B)( i).
120. § 171.1011(c)( 1)( B)( iii), (c)( 1)( B)( v), (c)( 2)( B)( iii), (c)( 2)( B)( iv). These
subtractions generally are aimed at ensuring that taxable margin is taxed only at one level.
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a "Flow-through" items that must be paid to other entities, including
taxes collected and remitted; sales commissions to non-employees for real
estate sales and "sales of products"; the tax basis of underwritten securi-
ties; and payments to subcontractors for real property surveying, repair,
or improvements; 121
* Dividends and interest from federal obligations, including foreign
royalties and dividends, such as amounts determined under section 78 or
sections 951-964 of the Internal Revenue Code;1 22
" Principal repayments received by lending institutions;123
" The federal tax basis of securities and loans sold;
1 24
" For lawyers, certain trust fund items and pro bono expenses; 125
" Reimbursements received by a "management company" for speci-
fied costs, including labor costs; 126
* Certain types of elderly, indigent health care, and worker's compen-
sation governmental reimbursements and costs of uncompensated care;
and' 2 7
* Revenue from small-production oil and gas wells during periods of
low prices,1 28 as certified by the Comptroller. 129
121. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(g)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Legislators intend
that certain flow-through items should be excluded from the tax base, although the scope
of flow-through expenses remains the subject of debate. To the extent flow-through items
are not included in revenue in the first place, no deduction is necessary to exclude the
items from the tax base. Thus, taxpayers should consider carefully whether or when pay-
ments that are not taxable income can appropriately be excluded from revenue reported
on the federal tax returns.
122. § 171.1011(m).
123. § 171.1011(g-1).
124. § 171.1011(g-2). Gains from the sale of securities are passive income for purposes
of the seller's qualification as a nontaxable passive entity. The statute includes no defini-
tion of securities for purposes of the passive-income test, and several commentators have
suggested that the legislature should enact a statutory definition. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.0003(a)( 2)( C) (Vernon Supp. 2006); see, e.g., Tax Section of the State Bar of Texas
State and Local Tax Committee Draft Comments to House Bill 3, p.10 . Texas Society of
Certified Public Accountants Comments to House Bill 3, p. 1 1.
125. § 171.1011(g-3). The pro bono exclusion from revenue for lawyers is limited to
$500 "per case" and excludes only "actual out-of-pocket expenses." Id.
126. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(m-1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). These costs are also
treated as part of the managed company's compensation or COGS deduction. "Manage-
ment company" is defined as "a corporation, limited liability company, or other limited
liability entity that conducts all or part of the active trade or business of another entity" in
exchange for a management fee and reimbursement of specified costs. The statute does
not define what, in this context, constitutes conducting part of the active business, what
items qualify for reimbursement, or how allocated expenses are treated.
127. In contrast to the fifty-percent deduction for costs of uncompensated care that is
allowed for health care institutions, physicians may deduct one hundred percent of speci-
fied health care costs. Unlike the pro bono exclusion for attorney, the exclusion for un-
compensated health care is not subject to a dollar limit and excludes the "actual cost to the
health care provider for any uncompensated care provided." TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1011(n)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006). It was widely expected that the deductions availa-
ble to physicians would be larger, based on discussions among physician groups and legisla-
tors; it is unclear whether the current legislative session will bring further changes. TEX.




Deductions From Revenues to Determine the "Margin"
A taxable entity computes its "margin" by subtracting, from total reve-
nues, its unilateral choice of either "cost of goods sold" ("COGS") or
"compensation," 130 although the taxable margin is capped at seventy per-
cent of total revenue from the entire business. t 31 However, entities re-
quired to file as a combined group will make an election that applies to
all the members; 132 thus, as a practical matter, separate companies in a
combined group are not permitted to choose which deduction to use.
Moreover, service companies effectively have no choice because the
COGS deduction is available only to sellers of goods. 133 Taxpayers may
change the election to deduct either COGS or compensation annually,
and the statute explicitly provides that the election may be changed after
the fact for a given year by filing an amended return. 134
Legislators will undoubtedly be urged to modify these provisions to
avoid the potential inequity underlying a tax plan that can so severely
penalize companies for being part of a combined group, but it is unclear
whether the cost of changing the tax (or the perceived risk of abusive
taxpayer planning) will preclude substantive legislative amendments.
The COGS Deduction
Rather than directly incorporating federal tax or generally accepted ac-
counting principle computations, the new Texas law defines COGS at
length. 135 The statute defines "Goods" to mean "real or tangible per-
sonal property sold in the ordinary course of business of a taxable en-
tity."'1 36 Thus, as noted earlier, an entity that does not sell goods
effectively has no choice of deduction. 37 Instead, the entity is limited to
the compensation deduction. Although federal income tax law addresses
costs of goods sold, and Forms 1120 and 1065 both include such costs, the
Texas definition does not match the federal concept.138 Nonetheless, sev-
eral federal tax rules and authorities are relevant.139
COGS includes only costs associated with real or tangible personal
property (such as software and certain films, recordings, and books), 140
and the statute explicitly provides that tangible personal property does
130. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a)( 1)( B)( ii) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
131. § 171.101(a)( 1)( A).
132. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
133. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
134. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
135. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012.
136. § 171.1012(a)( 1).
137. § 171.1012(k).
138. See Line 2 on both returns.
139. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A (2005) (capitalization and inclusion in inventory costs of
certain expenses); I.R.C. § 460 (1997) (special rules for long-term contracts); I.R.C. § 471
(1997) (inventories), each of which is cross-referenced by TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1012(g) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
140. See, e.g., § 171.1012(a)( 3)( A)( ii).
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not include sales of services or intangible property. 141 This definition of
tangible personal property, unlike the sales tax statutory definition, does
not specifically reference computer programs or telephone prepaid call-
ing cards. 142 However, subsequent margin tax subsections add specific
references to films, sound recordings, and "other similar property. 143
The margin tax also adopts the sales tax definition of "computer pro-
gram. ' 144 Many aspects of the COGS definition turn on whether a par-
ticular cost is a "direct" cost of producing or acquiring goods,145 but the
statute does not explicitly provide a global standard for differentiating
"direct" and "indirect" costs, or indicate whether interpretations devel-
oped for other Texas tax purposes apply (e.g., in the context of the sales
tax manufacturing exemption). 146 "Production" is defined to include
"construction, installation, manufacture, development, mining, extrac-
tion, improvement, creation, raising or growth.' 47 Some sections of this
laundry list, but not all, refer to both production and acquisition,148 al-
though it appears that many of the inconsistent provisions are drafting
omissions rather than intended distinctions.
Items included in COGS
COGS explicitly includes all "direct" costs of producing or acquiring
goods, including the following:149
* Labor;150
" Integrated materials;151
* Materials consumed in production processes; 152
141. § 171.1012(a)( 3)( B). The definition of tangible personal property appears to have
roots in both federal tax principles and Texas sales tax. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.009
(Vernon 2002) ("tangible personal property" for sales tax purposes).
142. Compare § 171.1012(a)( 3)( A), with § 151.009.
143. See, e.g., § 171.1012(a)( 3)( A)( ii).
144. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a)( 3)( A)( iii) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
145. See § 171.1012(c).
146. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §151.318(a)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (manufactur-
ing exemption reference to "tangible personal property directly used or consumed in"
manufacturing).
147. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
148. See, e.g., § 171.1012(f).
149. § 171.1012(c).
150. § 171.1012(c)( 1). While labor cost appears to include wages and benefits, ques-
tions exist concerning the employer's share of payroll expenses. The inclusion of labor in
the COGS deduction means that sellers of goods electing a COGS rather than a compensa-
tion deduction are effectively entitled to a deduction for at least some compensation costs.
Moreover, the COGS deduction appears to include some labor costs that are excluded
from the compensation deduction, such as amounts paid to independent contractors, or
salary and wage amounts in excess of $300,000 per person per year.
151. § 171.1012(c)( 2). The statute also allows a deduction for integrated materials and
refers to materials that are an "integral part" of specific property produced; however, the
statute does not explicitly specify whether the integral-part standard is to be determined by
reference to existing state tax law interpretations from other contexts (e.g., from sales tax
construction concepts).
152. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(c)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006). This deduction for
materials consumed in production raises still more definitional issues ("consumed in" and
"production") with respect to which sales tax concepts may be useful. See, e.g., TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 2002) (manufacturing exemption).
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" Packaging and handling and inbound transportation costs; 153
" Storage costs; 1 5 4
* "Depreciation, depletion, and amortization, to the extent associated
with and necessary for the production of goods" 155
* Costs to rent or lease equipment, facilities, and real property directly
used for production, including pollution control equipment and intangible
drilling and dry hole CoStS; 1 5 6
* Costs of preparing and maintaining production equipment and facili-
ties, including pollution control equipment;157
* Costs attributable to research, experimental, engineering, and design
activities directly related to the production of goods, including Internal
Revenue Code Section 174 research and development expenditures; 158
* Geological and geophysical costs incurred to locate property with
"the potential to produce minerals"; 159
" Certain taxes related to direct production costs; 160
" Cost of producing or acquiring electricity for sale; and161
" Contributions to a partnership in which the taxable entity owns an
interest that is used to fund activities, the cost of which would otherwise
be treated as the partnership's COGS (but only to the extent the costs are
"related to" goods distributed to the taxable entity as goods in kind in the
ordinary course of production activities). 162
While the statutory subsection containing the list above addresses "di-
rect costs," 1 6 3 a subsequent subsection provides that COGS also includes
the following "in relation to the taxable entity's goods. ' 164 Again, the
cobbling together of various drafts appears to have resulted in two sepa-
rate lists where, given the luxury of more time, the legislators might have
153. § 171.1012(c)( 4).
154. § 171.1012(c)( 5).
155. § 171.1012(c)( 6). The deductible amounts of depreciation, depletion, and amorti-
zation generally are determined with respect to federal income tax principles, but no ex-
plicit guidance is provided to determine whether a particular amount is "associated with
and necessary for the production of goods." This provision is one of many that mixes
federal tax concepts with state tax standards. In this mix, query whether standards like
"necessary for the production" will look to general federal income tax principles or to state
tax standards (e.g., the manufacturing rules for sales tax purposes). This item is also one of
several that illustrate well the difference between the deductions available to sellers of
goods and sellers of services. For example, a seller of desks may deduct depreciation for a
computer that is associated with and necessary for the production of the desks. However,
a seller of design services may not deduct depreciation for a computer that is associated
with and necessary for the production of desk designs.
156. § 171.1012(c)( 7).
157. § 171.1012(c)( 8).
158. § 171.1012(c)( 9). This deduction applies to research and development expendi-
tures "directly related to the production of goods" and raises more questions about the
meaning of "directly." Id.
159. § 171.1012(c)( 10).
160. § 171.1012(c)( 11).
161. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(c)( 12) (Vernon Supp. 2006).





drafted the list differently. In any event, section 171.1012(d) includes the
following:
* Deterioration of the goods; 165
" Obsolescence of the goods;' 66
" Spoilage and abandonment, including rework labor, reclamation,
and scrap costs; 1 6 7
" Certain direct pre-production costs;1 68
" Certain direct post-production coStS; 16 9
" Certain insurance costs (plant, facility, machinery, equipment, or
materials directly used in production);170
" Insurance on the produced goods; 171
* Utilities, specifically including electricity, gas, and water directly
used in production; 172
- Quality control, including warranty replacement of defective compo-
nents, inspection directly allocable to production, and repair and mainte-
nance of the goods;173
* Licensing or franchise costs, including fees incurred in securing con-
tractual rights to use trademarks, manufacturing procedure, or other
listed rights directly associated with the goods;174
9 Interest expense of a lending institution that offers loans to the pub-
lic (according to a separate "notwithstanding-anything-else" type provi-
sion), such a lending institution may elect to deduct COGS and treat its
interest expenses as COGS;1 75 and
* Certain "indirect or administrative, or overhead costs."'1 76
The section regarding indirect, administrative or overhead costs allows
deductions for these costs, including mixed service costs, such as security
services, legal services, data processing services, accounting services, per-
sonnel operations, or financial planning and management costs, if "alloca-
ble" to the acquisition or production of goods, but the deduction is
capped at four percent of "total indirect or administrative overhead
costs" and excludes any costs that are specifically excluded from the defi-
nition of COGS. 177
Legislators not only listed items that are COGS but also listed items
that are specifically excluded from COGS. 178 Specifically, the statute
165. § 171.1012(d)( 1).
166. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(d)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
167. § 171.1012(d)( 3).
168. § 171.1012(d)( 4).
169. § 171.1012(d)( 5).
170. § 171.1012(d)( 6).
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(d)( 7) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
172. § 171.1012(d)( 8).
173. § 171.1012(d)( 9).




178. See § 171.1012(e).
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provides that following costs are excluded from COGS:
* Costs of renting or leasing equipment, facilities, or real property not
used for production; 179
" Selling costs, including employee expenses related to sales; 180
" Distribution costs, including outbound transportation; 181
" Advertising;182
" Idle facility expense; 8 3
" Rehandling costs; 184
" Bidding costs, regardless of whether the bid leads to a contract;185
* Interest expense, other than for certain financial institutions;186
" Income taxes, including local, state, federal, and foreign income
taxes and income-based franchise taxes; 8 7
" Strike expenses; l88
" Officers' compensation;189 and
" Compensation for undocumented workers used for the production of
goods. 190
The new legislation indicates that, except for real property contractors
and federal government contractors who pass title to goods to the govern-
ment before production is complete, an entity is generally allowed a cost-
of goods-sold deduction only for costs incurred with respect' 91 to goods
that it owns.' 92 Motor vehicle lessors and renters, heavy equipment leas-
ing companies, and railroad rolling stock rental or leasing companies are
specifically authorized to use a cost-of-goods-sold deduction for items
that they rent or lease, 193 although it is unclear how strictly this provision
will be interpreted.
179. § 171.1012(e)( 1).
180. § 171.1012(e)( 2).
181. § 171.1012(e)( 3).
182. TEX. TAX'CODE ANN. § 171.1012(e)( 4) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
183. § 171.1012(e)( 5).
184. § 171.1012(e)( 6).
185. § 171.1012(e)( 7), (8).
186. § 171.1012(e)( 9).
187. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(e)( 10) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
188. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(e)( 11) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
189. § 171.1012(e)( 12). The margin tax does not distinguish, as the current franchise
tax does, between officers for industries which designate many persons as officers and of-
ficers for other industries. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(a)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006)
(as in effect until Jan. 1, 2008).
190. § 171.1012(e)( 14). For this purpose, "goods" specifically includes but is not lim-
ited to animal husbandry, crop growing and harvesting, and timber severance.
§ 171.1012(e)( 14)( B). The cost of benefits to such workers may, however, be deductible
as COGS. Against the backdrop of the national debate on immigration law, this provision
is not particularly surprising.
191. See § 171.1012(i). This provides that a taxable entity furnishing labor or materials
to certain construction, improvements, remodeling, and industrial maintenance projects is
considered an owner, and provides special rules for contracts with the federal government.
192. Id.
193. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(k-1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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The Tax Code defines "goods" for COGS purposes as "real or tangible
personal property sold in the ordinary course of business of a taxable
entity. ' 19 4 The term "sold" arguably suggests that renters or lessors gen-
erally cannot claim a COGS deduction; this interpretation is reinforced
by the special margin tax rule which authorizes certain specific types of
lessors and renters to take a COGS deduction, as well as by a proposed
amendment that died in committee which would have clarified that
"goods" for COGS purposes includes "real or tangible personal property
sold or rented in the ordinary course of business of a taxable entity."
However, in other tax contexts, particularly sales tax, Texas law often
treats leases and rentals as sales,195 so debate will continue.
In determining COGS, payments to an affiliate not part of a taxable
entity's combined group are deductible only if the transaction is "at arm's
length. ' 196 Although Texas has no COGS provision equivalent to Section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 197 this provision requires an analysis
(without much guidance) of what constitutes arm's length.198 The Comp-
troller could argue that this provision disallows any deduction, rather
than disallowing a deduction only for the portion of the payment in ex-
cess of arm's length, but such an interpretation appears unduly harsh and
inconsistent with prior sessions' legislative discussions and likely with this
legislature's interest.
The Compensation Deduction
Deductible compensation includes the following items:
* "Wages and cash compensation" paid to officers, directors, owners,
partners, and employees, 19 9 capped at $300,000 per person per year (in-
dexed for inflation). 20 0
The Comptroller's Guidelines provide that "net distributive income for
the calculation of compensation is the amount of guaranteed payments
194. § 171.1012(a)( 1).
195. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005(2) (Vernon 2002) (including "lease, or
rental of tangible personal property" in the definition of a sale).
196. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
197. I.R.C. § 482 (2002) (regarding allocation of income among certain entities under
common ownership or control).
198. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
199. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1013(b)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
200. § 171.1013(c). Treatment of payments made to independent contractors continues
to trigger substantial discussion, as well as suggestions for amending the statute to encom-
pass such payments specifically. The cost of "all benefits" provided to officers, directors,
owners, partners, and employees is not included in the $300,000 per person deduction cap.
"All benefits" is not statutorily defined, other than by providing that the term includes
workers' compensation benefits, health care, contributions to employee health savings ac-
counts, and deductible contributions to retirement plans. Because the $300,000 cap applies
to wages and not benefits, there would be an incentive, if Texas taxes were the only consid-
eration, to shift compensation for highly compensated employees from wages to benefits.
This incentive will be constrained to some extent by federal law, by the impact of such a
shift on other states' taxes, and by restrictions'on certain "top-heavy" benefit plans, though
nonqualified plans may have more flexibility. Moreover, the relatively low tax rate may
not provide sufficient savings to merit such shifts.
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and distributions made during the accounting period ... to natural per-
sons from limited liability companies and corporations treated as S corpo-
rations for federal income tax purposes. 201 However, calculating
deductions by reference to amounts actually paid during the tax period
would create a mismatch between the revenue and the expenses related
to that income that seems inconsistent with the margin tax language and
with sound policy.
In addition to the items listed above, the Tax Code provides that de-
ductible "wages and cash compensation" also consists of the following:20 2
" Wages and tips reported on Form W-2 for medicare tax purposes;2 03
" Net distributive income to natural persons from partnerships and
from trusts and LLCs treated as partnerships for federal income tax pur-
poses, net distributive income to natural persons from LLCs, and corpo-
rations treated as S Corporations for federal tax purposes;204
- Stock awards and stock options deducted for federal income tax pur-
poses; 20 5 and
* Special rules affecting "wages and cash compensation."
No deduction is allowed for "wages and cash compensation" paid to
undocumented workers, but a deduction is allowed for the cost of "all
benefits" provided to undocumented workers.2 06 Special provisions direct
that compensation paid to persons employed by staff-leasing companies
or management companies is deductible by the client company, not the
staff-leasing or management company.2 07 Generally, the thrust of the
staff-leasing and management company provisions, sprinkled throughout
the margin tax, is to treat workers assigned to an operating business as if
201. Texas Franchise Tax Information Report-General Instructions, http://www.win-
dow.state.tx.us/taxinfo/franchise/05-158_instructions/index.html (follow "Texas Franchise
Tax Information Report (05-158): General Instructions" hyperlink) (emphasis added).
202. § 171.1013(a).
203. Id. W-2 wages do not include the employer's share of federal employment taxes.
Payments to independent contractors reported on Form 1099 rather than W-2 raise addi-
tional issues. If no deduction is allowed for these Form 1099 payments, industries or busi-
nesses that use independent contractors for a significant part of their workforce may be
materially disadvantaged, particularly if they are not able to take a COGS deduction or to
exclude commission payments from revenue. Legislators may not have intended this re-
sult, and both they and the Comptroller appear to be considering carefully how to treat
Form 1099 amounts.
204. Id. The treatment as compensation of net distributive shares of natural persons
does not require that such "compensation" be related to labor performed by the recipient;
thus, a pass-through entity is allowed a deduction with respect to the distributive share of
net income of any individual investor. This deduction for net distribution income may be
intended to guard against assertions that the margin tax violates the "Bullock amendment"
to the Texas Constitution which requires voter approval of a tax on the income of natural
persons, "including a person's share of partnership and unincorporated association in-
come." However, since the deduction is capped at $300,000, some will undoubtedly argue
that the margin tax still reaches individuals' shares of partnership net income. The Bullock
amendment is article viii, section 24 of the Texas Constitution (named after a legendary
former Texas comptroller).
205. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1013(a)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
206. §§ 171.1013(b)( 2), (c-1).
207. §§ 171.1013(d)-( f).
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they were employed by that business for purposes of computing revenue
and related deductions.
Combined Reporting Principles
Texas has never required or permitted any form of consolidated or
combined reporting. Indeed, the stringent separate entity concept under-
lying the Texas franchise tax since its inception has allowed significant
planning opportunities for taxpayers in affiliated groups by allowing the
members to shift income and expenses among group members. The plan-
ning opportunities have been even greater since the federal check-the-
box-rules because taxpayers could often shift income and expenses to
out-of-state, disregarded LLCs. Those days of separate-entity simplicity
are gone under the margin tax because all taxable entities that are part of
an "affiliated group" engaged in a "unitary business" must report on a
combined basis.208
The Affiliated Group
For this purpose, "affiliated group" is defined as all entities in which a
"controlling" eighty percent or greater interest is owned by a common
owner or owners, or by one or more other members of the affiliated
group.209 The eighty-percent test for a corporation applies to "direct or
indirect" ownership of total combined voting power of all classes of stock
or the "beneficial ownership interest in the voting stock. '210 The eighty-
percent test for other entities applies to direct or indirect ownership of
"the capital, profits, or beneficial interest" in the entity. 211 In both cases,
the meaning of "indirect" is open to debate. Significantly, the Texas affili-
ated group definition is freestanding; it does not directly incorporate or
refer to any federal tax affiliated group classification or status.
Unfortunately, several aspects of the affiliated group definition remain
unclear. The eighty-percent test applies to voting or beneficial inter-
ests 2 Z2-but what if the same stock has different owners of voting rights
and beneficial interests? Also, the definition applies to eighty-percent
ownership "by a common owner or owners, either corporate or
noncorporate. '' 21 3 This phrasing suggests that overlapping ownership of
entities by natural persons could cause them to report on a combined
basis, an unusual result. Moreover, the common-ownership test does not
discriminate based on relative ownership shares by the common owners.
It suggests, for example, that a partnership owned ninety-nine percent by
person A and one percent by unrelated person B is part of an affiliated
group with a partnership owned one percent by person A and ninety-nine
208. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
209. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(1), (8) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (though legislators
plan to consider changing the eighty percent standard).
210. § 171.0001(8)( A).




percent by person B. Finally, the sheer potential breadth of the definition
creates a concern that seemingly independent entities could be traced
through to eighty-percent common ownership-but what if several pub-
licly held companies have eighty-percent common ownership? The im-
pact of this broad "affiliated group" definition is somewhat limited
because a combined reporting group includes only entities that are both
members of an affiliated group and engaged in a "unitary business. '214
A combined group excludes foreign affiliates meeting certain property
and payroll tests (or a gross receipts test if the affiliate has no payroll or
property) which establish that eighty percent of their operations are
outside the United States ("water's edge reporting"). 215 The tests for de-
termining the location of a foreign affiliate's payroll and property are im-
ported from the Multistate Tax Compact,216 and are new concepts in
Texas tax law.
While many states use a "unitary business" method of reporting state
income tax, Texas historically has not (although in limited circumstances
Texas has considered whether income from businesses is unitary).2 17 Al-
though the new Texas definition of unitary borrows from other defini-
tions, it is-like the margin tax itself-different from other states. For
margin tax purposes, "unitary business" means a single economic enter-
prise that is made up of separate parts of a single entity or of a commonly
controlled group of entities that are sufficiently interdependent, inte-
grated, and interrelated through their activities so as to provide a synergy
and mutual benefit that produces a sharing or exchange of value among
them and a significant flow of value to the separate parts. In determining
whether a unitary business exists, the Comptroller shall consider any rele-
vant factor, including whether:
(A) the activities of the group members:
(i) are in the same general line, such as manufacturing, whole-
saling, retailing of tangible personal property, insurance, trans-
portation, or finance; or
(ii) are steps in a vertically structured enterprise or process,
such as the steps involved in the production of natural re-
sources, including exploration, mining, refining, and marketing;
and
(B) The members are functionally integrated through the exercise of
strong centralized management, such as authority over purchasing,
financing, product line, personnel, and marketing.21 8
214. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(7) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
215. § 171.1014(a).
216. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 141.001 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (Texas adoption of Mul-
tistate Compact).
217. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon 2002) (allocation of certain taxable
earned surplus to Texas).
218. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(17) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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A single affiliated group can include multiple combined groups or entities
that report on a separate entity basis, depending on which groupings of
entities are "unitary."
As for the mechanics of combined group reporting: each member must
first compute "total revenue" on a separate entity basis;219 then, the
members' separately computed revenues are added together,220 and any
intra-group revenues are subtracted. 221 All combined group members
must make a uniform election to deduct either COGS or compensa-
tion,222 and the combined group's COGS or compensation deduction is
computed by determining deductible amounts (COGS or compensation)
on a separate entity basis, 223 adding together the separately computed
amounts,224 and subtracting any intra-group payments. 225 The difference
between the combined group's revenues and the combined group's de-
duction is the group's margin,226 which is apportioned to Texas on a com-
bined basis.2 27
As noted earlier in this article, the requirement that all members of a
combined reporting group be bound by a uniform election to use a
COGS or a compensation deduction may be quite harmful to members of
combined groups that include members with divergent operations.228 The
COGS-versus-compensation decision will virtually always be based on
which approach yields the lowest tax for the combined group; however,
that choice may result in individual members' receiving minimal offsets
against their revenue. For example, if a group includes both a manufac-
turing entity and a service provider, the group's taxes may be lower over-
all if it elects COGS, even though the service entity is not entitled to a
COGS deduction and its entire total revenues will be included in gross
margin. Moreover, if the seventy-percent cap on total revenues 229 applies
at the combined group level, as is generally assumed, the cap would not
limit to seventy percent the includible revenues of a member forced to
use a disadvantageous deduction method.
In two different places the margin tax statute specifies that a "com-
bined group" is deemed a single "taxable entity" for purposes of applying
the tax.230 In addition to creating confusion, this dual use of the term
"taxable entity" suggests that the combined group as a whole is subject to
either the default one-percent tax rate or the reduced half-percent tax
219. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(c)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
220. § 171.1014(c)( 2).
221. § 171.1014(c)( 3).
222. § 171.1014(d).
223. § 171.1014(e)( 1).
224. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(e)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
225. § 171.1014(e)( 3).
226. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101(a)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
227. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
228. See § 171.1014(d).
229. § 171.101(a)( 1)( A).
230. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (defining the term "taxable
entity"); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (combined reporting).
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rate for manufacturers and wholesalers, depending on whether the
group's combined revenues meet the objective tests to qualify for the
lower rate. By contrast, the mechanics for computing a combined group's
taxable margin require that each member's "total revenue" and its de-
ductible COGS or compensation must be computed "as if each member
were an individual taxable entity."' 231 Thus, at least some significant as-
pects of the margin tax computation are on a member-level rather than
group-level basis.
A combined group may elect to include and treat as taxable an exempt
entity that is otherwise part of its affiliated, unitary group.232 Such an
election could allow an exempt entity with high non-Texas gross receipts
and a low gross margin to reduce the combined group's taxable margin.
Another margin tax provision is intended to allow an upper-tier entity
(e.g., a partner) to elect to report and pay the tax on the taxable margin
of a lower level pass-through entity in which it owns an interest (e.g., a
partnership) but that is not part of its combined group; however, the
terms "upper tier" and "lower tier" are reversed in the statute as a result
of a drafting error.233
In an attempt to fill some gaps left by the statute, the Comptroller's
Guidelines define "Reporting Entity" as "the principal Texas entity that
is responsible for reporting on behalf of the combined group," and define
"Principal Texas entity" as
an entity that is the parent entity unless the parent entity is not sub-
ject to tax in Texas; is not part of the unitary business; or there is no
parent, in which case it means the entity that: (1) is included within
the group; (2) is subject to Texas' taxing jurisdiction; and (3) has the
greatest Texas business activity during the first year that a combined
return is required to be filed, as measured by the total revenue for
that year.234
Apportionment Concepts
The new tax imports most of the old tax's concepts for apportioning the
tax base. Thus, the margin tax allocation relies on a single-factor ap-
proach that multiplies the tax base by the ratio of an entity's or group's
Texas gross receipts to total gross receipts. 235 In a holdover from the
earned surplus component of the pre-margin franchise tax, "gross re-
ceipts" are generally to be determined under federal tax gross income
principles. 236 The principles for determining whether a particular gross
231. § 171.1014(f)( 1).
232. § 171.1014(g).
233. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1015 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
234. Texas Franchise Tax Information Report-Combinations and Eliminations Sched-
ule, http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/franchise/05-158_instructions/index.html (follow
"Texas Franchise Tax Information Report-Combinations and Eliminations Schedule (05-
161): Instructions" hyperlink).
235. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
236. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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receipt is a "Texas gross receipt" are largely unchanged from the old
franchise tax, although there are two significant changes.237 First, while
services generally continue to be sourced to Texas only if "performed in
this state, '238 receipts from servicing loans secured by real property are
now sourced to Texas if the real property is located in Texas.239 Second,
Texas has eliminated its long-standing "throwback rule," which sourced
to Texas any receipts from sales of tangible property shipped from Texas
into a state in which the seller has insufficient contact to be subject to
state income tax.2 40
For groups reporting on a combined basis, Texas has adopted the Joyce
rule to apportion the gross margin of combined groups that contain mem-
bers which lack tax nexus with Texas. 241 Under this rule, gross receipts
from any group members that do not have stand-alone tax nexus with
Texas are not treated as Texas gross receipts for apportionment pur-
poses; 242 however, such "no-nexus" group members' gross receipts are
included in total gross receipts.2 43 In other words, gross receipts from no-
nexus entities will be included in the denominator but not the numerator
of the group's apportionment factor.
"Gross receipts" for apportionment purposes are defined to include
"all revenues reportable by a taxable entity on its federal tax return, with-
out deduction ... unless otherwise specifically provided," though any re-
ceipts excluded from total revenues are also excluded from gross
receipts. 244 For combined groups, any intra-group revenues that are ex-
cluded from the computation of the combined group's total revenue are
generally excluded from receipts for apportionment purposes.245 To pre-
vent tax-avoidance structures, however, the legislation provides that if a
non-nexus member of a combined group sells into Texas, without modifi-
cation, any tangible property purchased from a member that has nexus,
then the non-nexus member's revenues are treated as Texas gross
receipts. 246
"Gross receipts" for apportionment purposes are defined differently
than "total revenues, ' 247 and it is possible that this difference may cause
some amounts to be included in one but not the other. Although this
possibility is reduced by excluding from gross receipts the amounts ex-
237. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
238. § 171.103(2).
239. Id.
240. In Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 175 S.W.3d 856, 868 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2005, pet. denied), the Austin Court of Appeals found that the throwback rule is
unconstitutional, at least in some circumstances.
241. In re Appeal of Joyce, Inc., No. 66-SBE-069, 1966 WL 6789 (Cal. St. Bd. Of Equal.,
Nov. 23, 1966); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
242. § 171.103(b).
243. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.105(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
244. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1121(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
245. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1055 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
246. Id.
247. Compare TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.105 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (gross receipts),
with TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (total revenue).
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cluded from revenues, there may be instances in which amounts included
in the definition of total revenues differ from amounts included in the
definition of gross receipts. However, some Comptroller representatives
have indicated their belief that gross receipts should equal gross
revenues.
Tax Rates
The default rate is one percent of taxable margin,248 but the rate is
reduced to one-half percent 249 if more than fifty percent 250 of a taxable
entity's total revenues are from "retail trade" or "wholesale trade '2 51 as
defined by the referenced Standard Industrial Classification ("SIC")
Codes2 52 (but excluding sellers of telecommunications or utilities), and
(other than for bars and restaurants) less than fifty percent of such retail/
wholesale revenues derives from products that a taxable entity or its affil-
iate produces.2 53 These tests are based on 1987 SIC classifications which
include bars and restaurants, rather than the more recent classifications.
The lower, one-half percent rate is not available to a taxable entity that
"provide[s] retail or wholesale utilities, including telecommunications ser-
vices and electricity or gas."'254 This limitation creates another "cliff,"
with perhaps unintended consequences: is a retailer that leases its excess
telecommunications circuit capacity to a third party ineligible for the
lower percent rate?2 55
Credits
Only limited credits are available against the margin tax, and they re-
late to previously accrued items. A taxpayer with certain losses from
prior years may use a portion of that loss as a credit, but confusing statu-
tory language has hampered taxpayers' (and the Comptroller's) ability to
compute the credit. By its terms, the temporary credit, which is intended
to be spread out over a ten-year period, is calculated by multiplying the
taxpayer's apportioned net operating losses and certain temporary ac-
counting differences by the tax rate and then multiplying that product by
ten percent.2 56 However, legislative discussions focused on "business
losses" accrued under the old franchise tax, and legislation will likely be
necessary to clarify the credit. The tax rate cited in this loss-credit provi-
248. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
249. § 171.002(b).
250. § 171.002(c)( 2).
251. § 171.002(c).
252. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(12), (18) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
253. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(b), (c), (c)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
254. § 171.002(c)( 3).
255. The Texas Tax Section Comments propose that this section be amended to make
explicit that the resale of excess telecommunications capacity should not be considered
retail or wholesale [utilities] trade. Letter from Texas Tax Section to Frank Battle, Senior
Counsel for Public Policy, State of Texas (Jan. 23, 2007) available at http://www.texastax
section.org/sectionoftaxationlettertoFrankBattleHB3.pdf.
256. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.111(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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sion is to the four-and-one-half percent rate appearing in the old
franchise tax provisions (i.e., the rate against which accrued Texas
franchise tax business losses would have been credited under pre-margin
tax law). 257 However, House Bill No. 3 repeals that section, and the
Comptroller's office has indicated, including in the directions in the on-
line franchise tax calculator, 258 that the new margin tax rates should ap-
ply, so legislators may also address the tax rate.
Although the credit provision refers to March 1, 2007, as the date by
which a taxable entity is to notify the Comptroller of the taxpayer's intent
to claim this credit, 259 that date is unreasonably early, particularly in view
of the many unanswered questions with respect to the credit. The Comp-
troller has adopted a rule that would instead require notice on or before
September 1, 2007.260
. Other credits that taxpayers are allowed to carry forward from the old
franchise tax to the new margin tax are the strategic investment area
credit, 261 the research and development credit,262 the job creation
credit,263 and the capital investment credit.264
Effective Date and Transition Issues
The various transition rules are reasonably clear as applied to individ-
ual entities, but there is some ambiguity in applying these rules to a com-
bined group, particularly if the combined group contains some members
subject to the existing franchise tax and other members who will be newly
subject to the margin tax. Statutory references to the period on which the
tax is based further complicate determining when and on what basis re-
turns must be filed. Although the Comptroller is working to provide in-
formal or regulatory guidance on these issues, legislators may also enact
technical corrections to address several of these issues. 265
As noted earlier, the margin tax will be effective for reporLs due on or
after January 1, 2008, but those reports will include revenues from earlier
periods.266 For example, a calendar year taxpayer will file a report May
15, 2008, which will include a margin tax computed with respect to all
revenues earnedduring calendar year 2007. For fiscal year taxpayers, the
257* § 171.111(b)( 4).
258. Franchise Tax Calculator, http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/franchise/calcula-
tor/ (follow "Download the Franchise Tax Calculator (PDF)." hyperlink).
259. § 171.111(a).
260. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.594 (2007) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin:
Temp. Credit).
261. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.722-.723 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
262. Id.
263. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.752-.753 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
264. TEX. TAx.CODE ANN. §§ 171.802-.803 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
265. As a planning and revenue-projection tool for the state, certain large taxpayers are
required to file -information reports by February 15, 2007, to report the margin tax they
would have paid based on 2005 activity had the margin tax been in effect for that year. It is
widely expected that legislators may delay enacting margin tax amendments until these
returns have been filed.
266. Tex. H.B. 3 § 22(a), 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006).
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margin tax computations cannot apply to business activity before June 1,
2006.267 Transition provisions specify the accounting periods on which the
tax is based for the first reports filed by entities made newly subject to tax
by the margin tax (e.g., partnerships). 268 Anti-tax avoidance provisions
are designed to treat successor partnerships as "continuations" of prede-
cessor partnerships for purposes of computing the initial report under the
margin tax.269
The Guidelines address a question not answered by the statute, by pro-
viding that if the taxable year of a member differs from the taxable year
of the group, the principal Texas entity may elect to determine the por-
tion of that member's revenue and cost of goods sold or compensation
amounts to be included in the report in one of the following ways: a sepa-
rate income statement prepared from the books and records for the
months included in the group's taxable year; or including all of the in-
come for the year that ends during the group's taxable year.270
The Guidelines further state that the "same method must be used for
each member with a different accounting period. '271
The margin tax legislation explicitly and repeatedly delegates to the
Comptroller the authority to enact administrative rules interpreting or
implementing many facets of the new tax system. The Comptroller's on-
line "Franchise Tax Calculator" and a few letter rulings offer some insight
to taxpayers. However, the massive changes enacted to the franchise tax
system will undoubtedly produce not only confusion and controversy, but
also judicial and legislative attention. The Texas Legislature's 2007 regu-
lar session began in January and should yield at least some technical cor-
rections. Although taxpayers will ask legislators to consider major
revisions, legislators are unlikely to overhaul the margin tax.
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. LEGISLATION
The Texas Legislature's lowering of school property taxes was the most
significant 2006 Texas property tax development. School property taxes
are comprised of essentially two different tax rates-the maintenance tax
rate (the "M&O Rate") for regular operating expenses,272 and the inter-
est and sinking fund rate for servicing debt. 273 Pursuant to new section
42.2516 of the Texas Education Code, sufficient state funds will be pro-
vided to each school district to enable it to reduce its M&O property tax
267. Tex. H.B. 3 § 22(b).
268. Id.
269. Tex. H.B. 3 § 22(f).
270. Texas Franchise Tax Information Report-Combination and Eliminations Schedule,
http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/franchise/05-158-instructions/index.html (follow
"Texas Franchise Tax Information Report-Combinations and Eliminations Schedule (05-
161): Instructions" hyperlink).
271. Id.




rate by 12.67 percent in 2007 and by 33.33 percent in 2008 and later years,
in each case as compared to its 2005 M&O property tax rate.274 Thus, if a
school district taxes at the maximum M&O property tax rate ($1.50 per
$100 valuation) in 2005, its M&O rate will ultimately be lowered to $1.00
per $100 valuation. The Texas Legislature established a property tax re-
lief fund to be used to make payments to school districts to enable them
to lower their M&O rate as required by law.275 The property tax relief
fund, which is a special fund outside the general revenue fund, accumu-
lates a specified percentage of the new Texas franchise tax, the increase in
the cigarette tax and the amended motor vehicle sales tax.276
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ATI-ORNEY GENERAL OPINION
Several of the cases during the 2006 Survey period demonstrate that
the consequences of failure to follow statutory procedural requirements
can be dire, for taxpayer and appraisal districts alike. A perfect example
is Jim Wells County v. El Paso Production Oil and Gas Co., in which the
Houston Court of Appeals for the First District held that a tax unit, com-
mon-law suit against several oil companies alleging fraud to achieve
lower property taxes must be dismissed because the tax units failed to
utilize required administrative remedies. 277 In Jim Wells, numerous
counties and school districts sued in state district courts for fraud and
similar actions against multiple energy companies, alleging that the en-
ergy companies conspired to defraud the taxing units by manipulating oil
and gas markets in order to undervalue property for property tax pur-
poses. 278 The tax units filed suit without having raised this issue with an
appraisal review board under the procedures prescribed in the Tax
Code.279
The energy companies asserted that the lawsuits should be dismissed
for failure of the tax units to exhaust their administrative remedies. The
tax units asserted that their fraud claims are common law claims not gov-
erned by the Tax Code. The court of appeals rejected the tax units' argu-
ments and upheld the lower courts' dismissal of the lawsuits. 280 The court
of appeals concluded that the tax units should have raised the issue under
section 25.21 of the Tax Code, which allows the appraisal district to tax
property omitted from the tax rolls in prior years.2 81 The tax units as-
serted that section 25.21 does not apply to undervalued property, and
thus its only remedy would be under common law. However, the court of
appeals concluded that section 25.21 does apply to property undervalued
274. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 42.2516(a), (a-i) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
275. TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 403.109 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
276. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.4011, 152.1222, 154.6035 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
277. 189 S.W. 3d 861, 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
278. Id. at 866-67. Specifically, the tax units alleged that the energy companies inten-
tionally sold energy to affiliates for lower prices, who later sold for higher prices to unre-
lated third parties, and based appraisals on these lower sales prices.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 872.
281. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.21 (Vernon 2002).
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due to fraud.282
Similarly, in Houston LS.D. v. 1615 Corp., the application of the exclu-
sive remedies provisions of the Tax Code was the death knell of a tax-
payer's property tax claim.28 3 This case concerns a taxpayer suit to avoid
a foreclosure sale of its property for delinquent property taxes. The tax-
payer had acquired the property after the resolution of a tax suit that
resulted in the assessment of delinquent property taxes on the prop-
erty.28 4 The taxpayer asserted in its lawsuit that property taxes were sub-
stantially overstated because of a mistake by the tax units in removing a
homestead exemption. However, the taxpayer filed the lawsuit (seeking
an equitable bill of review, among other remedies) without having com-
plied with the administrative remedies set forth in the Tax Code. The
Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District previously held
that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was not grounds for
dismissing the lawsuit,285 but changed its opinion following the Texas Su-
preme Court's holding in Cameron Appraisal District v. Rourk, where the
supreme court stated that the supreme court has "repeatedly held that a
taxpayer failure to pursue an appraisal review board proceeding deprives
the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to [property]
taxes. " 286
In Letter Opinion GA-0485, the Attorney General addressed whether
property owned by a limited partnership formed by a government entity
as a general partner and a nonprofit entity as a limited partner can be
exempt from property taxes as public property.287 Under section 11.11 of
the Tax Code, property owned by the state or a political subdivision is
exempt if the property is used for public purposes. 288 The Attorney Gen-
eral stated that the issue must be considered on a case-by-case basis, but
set forth two ground rules for addressing the issue.289 First, under part-
nership statutes, a limited partnership's property belongs to the limited
partnership and not to its partners; thus, as a partner of the limited part-
nership, the government entity does not own the property.290 Second,
there can be circumstances in which a government entity does not own
legal title to property but owns such property through equitable title (and
thus could take advantage of the exemption under section 11.11).291 In
order to own equitable title to property, the government entity must have
282. Jim Wells, 189 S.W.3d at 872.
283. 217 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
284. Id. at 632.
285. Id. at 634 (citing Houston I.S.D. v. 1615 Corp., No. 14-04-00859-CV, 2005 WL
2787279, at *4-6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 27, 2005, no pet. h.) (withdrawn)).
286. 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006). Presumably, the taxpayer's best claim would
have been a clerical error under section 25.25(c)( 3) of the Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 25.25(c)( 1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
287. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0485 (2006).
288. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(a) (Vernon 2002).





the present right to compel legal title to itself.292
In Patterson-UTI Drilling Co. v. Webb County Appraisal District, the
San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the tax situs of mobile drilling
rigs. Patterson Drilling owns hundreds of drilling rigs that it moves
throughout Texas at its clients' requests. 293 Its principal place of business
is in Scurry County, Texas.294 The rigs move constantly, with each job
taking as short as two weeks or as long as five months. 295 Until there is
another job for a rig, it remains at its last job site.296 On January 1, 2002,
two of Patterson Drilling's rigs were in Webb County, had been there
approximately six months, and had each been idle for over a month.297
Patterson Drilling rendered these rigs in Scurry County, but Webb
County also asserted taxes on these rigs, resulting in double taxation.298
The trial court concluded that the rigs had been in Scurry County for
more than a temporary period and held that they were taxable in Webb
County for the 2002 tax year.299
Under section 21.02 of the Tax Code, tangible personal property is tax-
able by a taxing unit if, among other ways for it to be taxable in such
taxing unit, the property is located in the tax unit on January 1 of the tax
year for more than a temporary period.300 The Tax Code, however, does
not define "temporary period." Thus, the court of appeals addressed this
term as it applied to the two rigs. The court of appeals concluded that
"temporary period" means "lasting for a limited time.' '30 1 Because the
rigs were constantly moving and remained in Webb County only until
needed at another site, the court of appeals concluded that the rigs should
not be taxed in Webb County. 30 2
IV. PROCEDURE
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Strayhorn, the Texarkana Court of Ap-
- peals addressed the interplay between the franchise tax and the statute of
limitations.30 3 While the case addresses franchise taxes, the more inter-
esting analysis is its focus on procedural matters. El Paso Natural Gas
Company ("El Paso") contested its franchise tax liability over a three-
292. Id.




297. Patterson-UT Drilling, 182 S.W.3d at 16.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.02(a) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
301. Patterson-UT! Drilling, 182 S.W.3d. at 18.
302. Id. at 19. Ultimately, the rigs stayed in Webb County until January 1, 2003, be-
cause Patterson Drilling secured the next contract for these rigs for use in Webb County.
However, the court noted that such facts are irrelevant to the taxable situs issue because
the situs issue is determined by looking back in time to the location of the property in the
year preceding January 1, 2002. Id. at 18.
303. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Strayhorn, 208 S.W.3d 676, 678-81(Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2006, no pet. h.)
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year period as a consequence of a series of events stemming from the
Comptroller's change in policy regarding the accounting methods availa-
ble to petroleum producers and manufacturers. 30 4 In February 1991, the
Comptroller announced that petroleum producers and manufactures
could use either the "full cost" or the "successful efforts" accounting
method and allowed taxpayers to amend their 1988, 1989, and 1990
franchise tax returns "to reflect a change from the 'full cost' accounting
method to the 'successful efforts' method. '30 5 To take advantage of this
opportunity, taxpayers had to file the amended returns by February 28,
1991.306 However, a "protective claim" letter filed by that same date and
later supplemented with the amended returns at any time within the fol-
lowing six months would also satisfy the deadline. 30 7 The Comptroller's
allowance of these retroactive accounting changes appeared to directly
conflict with Rule 3.391, which expressly forbids retroactive accounting
changes not designed to correct mathematical or accounting errors.308
El Paso mailed its protective claim letter by February 28, 1991, but the
Comptroller never received the letter.30 9 And the mere mailing was held
insufficient to preserve El Paso's right to amend its returns.310 Alterna-
tively, El Paso argued that the Comptroller violated Rule 3.391 by setting
the arbitrary February 28, 1991, deadline. 311 The court of appeals dis-
missed this argument by noting that the Comptroller had the power to
suspend Rule 3.391 for a limited period of time.312 The court of appeals
reasoned that the creation of a temporary window allowing such retroac-
tive accounting changes is within the Comptroller's authority because, "as
Section 111.002(a) of the Texas Tax Code makes clear, the Comptroller
has the statutory discretion to adopt reasonable rule changes that do not
conflict with Texas law."'313 Thus, "because this was a rule change and
not a statutory change, the Comptroller was authorized to limit the time
frame for the rule change's applicability." 314
V. WHAT'S NEXT?
From the next legislative session, we will see substantive procedural
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